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Abstract
By representing the range of fair betting odds according to a pair of confidence set estimators,
dual probability measures on parameter space called frequentist posteriors secure the coherence
of subjective inference without any prior distribution. The closure of the set of expected losses
corresponding to the dual frequentist posteriors constrains decisions without arbitrarily forcing op-
timization under all circumstances. This decision theory reduces to those that maximize expected
utility when the pair of frequentist posteriors is induced by an exact or approximate confidence set
estimator or when an automatic reduction rule is applied to the pair. In such cases, the resulting
frequentist posterior is coherent in the sense that, as a probability distribution of the parameter
of interest, it satisfies the axioms of the decision-theoretic and logic-theoretic systems typically
cited in support of the Bayesian posterior. Unlike the p-value, the confidence level of an interval
hypothesis derived from such a measure is suitable as an estimator of the indicator of hypothesis
truth since it converges in sample-space probability to 1 if the hypothesis is true or to 0 otherwise
under general conditions.
Keywords: attained confidence level; coherence; coherent prevision; confidence distribution; decision
theory; minimum expected loss; fiducial inference; foundations of statistics; imprecise probability;
maximum utility; observed confidence level; problem of regions; significance testing; upper and lower
probability; utility maximization
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
A well known mistake in the interpretation of an observed confidence interval confuses confidence as
a level of certainty with confidence as the coverage rate, the almost-sure limiting rate at which a
confidence interval would cover a parameter value over repeated sampling from the same population.
This results in using the stated confidence level, say 95%, as if it were a probability that the parameter
value lies in the particular confidence interval that corresponds to the observed sample. A practical
solution that does not sacrifice the 95% coverage rate is to report a confidence interval that matches a
95% credibility interval computable from Bayes's formula given some matching prior distribution (Ru-
bin, 1984). In addition to canceling the error in interpretation, such matching enables the statistician
to leverage the flexibility of the Bayesian approach in making jointly consistent inferences, involving,
for example, the probability that the parameter lies in any given region of the parameter space, on
the basis of a posterior distribution firmly anchored to valid frequentist coverage rates. Priors yielding
exact matching of predictive probabilities are available for many models, including location models and
certain location-scale models (Datta et al., 2000; Severini et al., 2002). Although exact matching of
fixed-parameter coverage rates is limited to location models (Welch and Peers, 1963; Fraser and Reid,
2002), priors yielding asymptotic matching have been identified for other models, e.g., a hierarchical
normal model (Datta et al., 2000). For mixture models, all priors that achieve matching to second
order necessarily depend on the data but asymptotically converge to fixed priors (Wasserman, 2000).
Data-based priors can also yield second-order matching with insensitivity to the sampling distribu-
tion (Sweeting, 2001). Agreeably, Fraser (2008b) suggested a data-dependent prior for approximating
the likelihood function integrated over the nuisance parameters to attain accurate matching between
Bayesian probabilities and coverage rates. These advances approach the vision of building an objec-
tive Bayesianism, defined as a universal recipe for applying Bayes theorem in the absence of prior
information (Efron, 1998).
Viewed from another angle, the fact that close matching can require resorting to priors that change
with each new observation, cracking the foundations of Bayesian inference, raises the question of
whether many of the goals motivating the search for an objective posterior can be achieved apart from
Bayes's formula. It will in fact be seen that such a probability distribution lies dormant in nested
confidence intervals, securing the above benefits of interpretation and coherence without matching
priors, provided that the confidence intervals are constructed to yield reasonable inferences about the
value of the parameter for each sample from the available information.
Unless the confidence intervals are conservative by construction, the condition of adequately incor-
porating any relevant information is usually satisfied in practice since confidence intervals are most
appropriate when information about the parameter value is either largely absent or included in the in-
terval estimation procedure, as it is in random-effects modeling and various other frequentist shrinkage
methods. Likewise, confidence intervals known to lead to pathologies tend to be avoided. (Patholog-
ical confidence intervals often emphasized in support of credibility intervals include formally valid
confidence intervals that lie outside the appropriate parameter space (Mandelkern, 2002) and those
that can fail to ascribe 100% confidence to an interval deduced from the data to contain the true
value (Bernardo and Smith, 1994).) A game-theoretic framework makes the requirement more precise:
for the 95% confidence interval to give a 95% degree of certainty in the single case and to support
coherent inferences, it must be generated to ensure that, on the available information, 19:1 are approx-
imately fair betting odds that the parameter lies in the observed interval. This condition rules out the
use of highly conservative intervals, pathological intervals, and intervals that fail to reflect substan-
tial pertinent information. In relying on an observed confidence interval to that extent, the decision
maker ignores the presence of any recognizable subsets (Gleser, 2002), not only slightly conservative
subsets, as in the tradition of controlling the rate of Type I errors Casella (1987), but also slightly
anti-conservative subsets. Given the ubiquity of recognizable subsets (Buehler and Feddersen, 1963;
Bondar, 1977), this strategy uses pre-data confidence as an approximation to post-data confidence
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in the sense in which expected Fisher information approximates observed Fisher information (Efron
and Hinkley, 1978), aiming not at exact inference but at a pragmatic use of the limited resources
available for any particular data analysis. Certain situations may instead call for careful applications
of conditional inference (Goutis and Casella, 1995; Sundberg, 2003; Fraser, 2004) for basing decisions
more directly on the data actually observed.
1.2 Direct inference and attained confidence
The above betting interpretation of a frequentist posterior will be generalized in a framework of
decision to formalize, control, and extend the common practice of equating the level of certainty
that a parameter lies in an observed confidence interval with the interval estimator's rate of coverage
over repeated sampling.
Many who fully understand that the 95% confidence interval is defined to achieve a 95% coverage
rate over repeated sampling will for that reason often be substantially more certain that the true
value of the parameter lies in an observed 99% confidence interval than that it lies in a 50% confidence
interval computed from the same data (Franklin, 2001; Pawitan, 2001, pp. 11-12). This direct inference,
reasoning from the frequency of individuals of a population that have a certain property to a level of
certainty about whether a particular sample from the population, is a notable feature of inductive logic
(e.g., Franklin, 2001; Jaeger, 2005) and often proves effective in everyday decisions. Knowing that the
new cars of a certain model and year have speedometer readings within 1 mile per hour (mph) of the
actual speed in 99.5% of cases, most drivers will, when betting on whether they comply with speed
limits, have a high level of certainty that the speedometer readings of their particular new cars of that
model and year accurately report their current speed in the absence of other relevant information.
(Such information might include a reading of 10 mph when the car is stationary, which would indicate
a defect in the instrument at hand.) If the above betting interpretation of the confidence level holds
for an interval given by some predetermined level of confidence, then coherence requires that it hold
equally for a level of confidence given by some predetermined hypothesis.
Fisher's fiducial argument also employed direct inference (Fisher, 1945; Fisher, 1973, pp. 34-
36, 57-58; Hacking, 1965, Chapter 9; Zabell, 1992). The present framework departs from his in its
applicability to inexact confidence sets, in the closer proximity of its probabilities to repeated-sampling
rates of covering vector parameters, in its toleration of reference classes with relevant subsets, and in its
theory of decision. Since the second and third departures are shared with recent methods of computing
the confidence probability of an arbitrary hypothesis (3.2.2), the main contribution of this paper is
the general framework of inference that both motivates such methods given an exact confidence set
and extends them for use with approximate, valid, and nonconservative set estimators and for coherent
decision making, including prediction and point estimation.
This framework draws from the theory of coherent upper and lower probabilities for the cases in
which no exact confidence set with the desired properties is available. To allow indecision in light of
inconclusive evidence, these non-additive probabilities have been formulated for lotteries in which the
agent may either place a bet or refrain from betting or, equivalently, in which the casino posts different
odds to be used depending on whether a gambler bets for or against a hypothesis. Confidence decision
theory will be formulated for this scenario by setting an agent's prices of buying and selling a gamble
on the hypothesis that a parameter θ is in some set Θ′ ∈ Θ according to the confidence levels of a
valid set estimate and a nonconservative confidence set estimate that coincide with Θ′. As a result,
the hypothesis has an interval of confidence levels rather than a single confidence level. Equating the
buying and selling prices reduces the upper and lower probability functions to a single frequentist
posterior, a probability measure on parameter space Θ, and thus reduces the interval to a point.
1.3 Overview
This subsection outlines the organization of the remainder of the paper while offering a brief summary.
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After preliminary concepts are defined (2.1), Section 2.2 presents the new framework for confidence-
based inference and decision. The family of probability measures (frequentist posteriors) used in in-
ference and decision can be stated in terms of coherent lower and upper probabilities and is thus
completely self-consistent according to a widely accepted account of coherence derived from ideas of
Bruno de Finetti (2.3). This lays a foundation for decisions and for flexible inference about the truth
of hypotheses without invoking the likelihood principle (2.4, 2.5). The framework is compared to
other versions of frequentist coherence based on upper and lower probabilities in Section 2.5.
While reporting an interval level of confidence in a hypothesis has the advantage of honestly com-
municating the insufficiency of the data to determine a single confidence level, such intervals are less
useful in situations requiring the automation of decisions. Under such circumstances, the family of fre-
quentist posteriors can be reduced to a single frequentist posterior by the use of exact or approximate
confidence sets or by an automatic reduction rule (3.1). For a single frequentist posterior, confidence
decision theory is equivalent to the minimization of expected posterior loss (3.2). As a probability
measure on hypothesis space, the resulting frequentist posterior satisfies the same coherence axioms
as the Bayesian posterior whether or not it is compatible with any prior distribution (3.3). The
important special case of a scalar parameter of interest provides an arena for contrasting frequentist
posterior probabilities and p-values (3.4).
The confidence framework provides direct and simple approaches to common problems of data
analysis, as will be illustrated by example in Sections 3.2 and 3.4.3. Examples include reporting
probabilistic levels of confidence of the interval, two-sided null hypotheses required in bioequivalance
testing, assigning confidence to a complex region, and assessing practical or scientific significance.
Posterior point estimates and predictions that account for parameter uncertainty are also available
without relinquishing the objectivity of the Neyman-Pearson framework.
Section 4 concludes the paper by highlighting the main properties of the proposed framework.
2 Confidence decision theory
2.1 Preliminaries
2.1.1 Basic notation
The values of x∧ y and x∨ y are respectively the minimum and maximum of x and y. The symbols ⊆
and ⊂ respectively signify subset and proper subset. 1Θ′ : Θ→ {0, 1} is the usual indicator function:
1Θ′ (θ) is 1 if θ ∈ Θ′ or 0 if θ /∈ Θ′.
Angular brackets rather than parentheses signal numeric tuples. For example, if x and y are
numbers, then 〈x, y〉 denotes an ordered pair, whereas (x, y) denotes the open interval {z : x < z < y} .
Given a probability space (Ω,Σ, Pξ) indexed by the vector parameter ξ ∈ Ξ ⊆ Rd, consider the
random quantity X of distribution Pξ and with a realization x in some sample set Ω ⊆ Rn. Without
loss of generality, partition the full parameter ξ into an interest parameter θ ∈ Θ and, unless θ = ξ, a
nuisance parameter γ ∈ Γ, such that ξ ∈ Θ× Γ and Pθ,γ = Pξ.
Except where otherwise noted, every probability distribution is a standard (Kolmogorov) probabil-
ity measure. An incomplete probability measure is a standard, additive measure with total mass less
than or equal to 1.
Let (Θ,A) represent a measurable space and B ([0, 1]) the Borel σ-field of [0, 1]. The complement
and power set of Θ′ are Θ¯′ and 2Θ
′
, respectively. The σ-field induced by C is σ (C).
2.1.2 Metameasure and metaprobability spaces
The following slight extension of probability theory is facilitates a clear and precise presentation of the
present framework. To avoid unnecessary confusion between single-valued probability and the specific
type of multi-valued probability required, the former will be called probability in agreement with
common usage, and the latter will be called metaprobability, a term defined below.
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Definition 1. Given a measurable space (Θ,A) and a metameasure space, the tripleM = (Θ,A,P)
with a family P of measures, the metameasure P ofM is a function P from A to the set of all closed
intervals of [0,∞) such that P (A) is the closure of
{P (A) : P ∈ P}
for each A ∈ A. The metameasure P is said to be degenerate if |P| = 1 or nondegenerate if |P| > 1.
Definition 2. The metameasure P of a metameasure spaceM = (Θ,A,P) is a probability metamea-
sure if each member of P is a probability measure. Then M is called a metaprobability space, and
P (A) is called the metaprobability of event A for all A ∈ A. The expectation interval or expected
interval E (L) of a measurable map L : A → R1 with respect to a probability metameasure P onM
is the closure of {∫
L (ϑ) dP (ϑ) : P ∈ P
}
.
In words, the expectation interval of a random quantity with respect to a probability metameasure
is the smallest closed interval containing the expectation values of the random quantity with respect
to the probability measures of the metaprobability space.
2.2 Confidence measures and metameasures
Particular types of confidence sets form the basis of the metameasure on which confidence decision
theory rests.
Definition 3. A set estimator Θˆ for θ is a function defined on Ω× [0, 1] . A set estimator is called valid
if its coverage rate over repeated sampling is at least as great as ρ, the nominal confidence coefficient:
Pξ
(
θ ∈ Θˆ (X; ρ)
)
≥ ρ
for all ξ ∈ Ξ and ρ ∈ [0, 1] . A set estimator is called nonconservative if its coverage rate over repeated
sampling is at no greater than the nominal confidence coefficient:
Pξ
(
θ ∈ Θˆ (X; ρ)
)
≤ ρ
for all ξ ∈ Ξ and ρ ∈ [0, 1] . A set estimator that is both valid and nonconservative is called exact. For
some set C of connected subsets of C, a set estimator is called nested if it is a function Θˆ : Ω× [0, 1]→ C
such that such that, for all x ∈ Ω, there is a C (x) ⊆ C such that Θˆ (x; •) : [0, 1] → C (x) is bijective,
Θˆ (x; 0) = ∅, Θˆ (x; 1) = Θ, and
Θˆ (x; ρ1) ⊆ Θˆ (x; ρ2) (1)
for all 0 ≤ ρ1 ≤ ρ2 ≤ 1. Two nested set estimators Θˆ1 : Ω × [0, 1] → C and Θˆ2 : Ω × [0, 1] → C are
dual if the ranges C1 (x) and C2 (x) of Θˆ1 (x; •) and Θˆ2 (x; •) induce the same σ-field, i.e., σ (C1 (x)) =
σ (C2 (x)) , for each x ∈ Ω.
The desired metameasure will be constructed from two confidence measures in turn constructed
from dual nested set estimators.
Definition 4. Let Θˆ : Ω×[0, 1]→ C denote a nested set estimator and Ax the σ-field induced by C (x) ,
the range of Θˆ (x; •) for each x ∈ Ω. Then, for all x ∈ Ω, Θˆ induces the probability space (Θ,Ax, P x)
and the confidence measure or frequentist posterior P x, the probability measure on Ax such that
Θ′ ∈ C (x) =⇒ Θ′ = Θˆ (x;P x (Θ′)) . (2)
The probability P x (Θ′) is the confidence level of the hypothesis that θ ∈ Θ′. If Θˆ is valid, nonconser-
vative, or exact, then P x and P x (Θ′) are likewise called valid, nonconservative, or exact, respectively.
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The next result provides the confidence level of any hypothesis that θ ∈ Θ′ ∈ Ax as the sum of
confidence levels given more directly by equation (2).
Proposition 5. For each x ∈ Ω, let (Θ,Ax, P x) be the confidence measure induced by the nested set
estimator Θˆ : Ω × [0, 1] → C, and let C (x) be the range of Θˆ (x; •) . For some K ∈ {1, 2, . . . } , let
Θ′ = ∪Kk=1Θ′k, where Θ′k ∈ Ax and
i 6= j =⇒ Θ′i ∩Θ′j = ∅.
Then
P x (Θ′) =
K∑
k=1
(
P x
(
Θ+k
)− P x (Θ−k )) , (3)
where
Θ+k = arg inf
Θ′′∈C(x),Θ′⊆Θ′′
|Θ′′|
and Θ−k = Θ
+
k \Θ′k for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} .
Proof. P x
(
Θ+k
)
= P x (Θ′k) + P
x
(
Θ−k
)
and P x
(∪Kk=1Θ′k) = ∑Kk=1 P x (Θ′k) follow from the mutual
exclusivity of the sets and from the additivity of the measure P x.
Thus, since, for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} , both Θ+k and Θ−k are in C (x) and since C (x) induces Ax,
equations (2) and (3) can be used to calculate P x (Θ′) for any Θ′ ∈ Ax.
Definition 6. Consider the dual nested set estimators Θ≥ : Ω × [0, 1] → C, which is valid, and
Θ≤ : Ω × [0, 1] → C, which is nonconservative. For every x ∈ Ω, let Ax denote the common σ-field
induced by each of the ranges of Θˆ≥ (x; •) and Θˆ≤ (x; •) . If P x≥ is the valid confidence measure, the
confidence measure induced by Θ≥, then P x≥ (Θ
′) is called a valid confidence level of the hypothesis
that θ ∈ Θ′. For each x ∈ Ω, the dual nonconservative confidence measure P x≤ and nonconservative
confidence level P x≤ (Θ
′) are defined analogously. On the metaprobability space
Mx≥,≤ =
(
Θ,Ax,{P x≥, P x≤}) ,
called a confidence metameasure space, the probability metameasure Px is called the confidence
metameasure induced by Θˆ≥ and Θˆ≤ given some x in Ω. Accordingly, the confidence metalevel of
the hypothesis that θ ∈ Θ′ is Px (Θ′) for all Θ′ ∈ Ax. By the definition of metaprobability, any
hypothesis Θ′ ∈ Ax has a confidence metalevel of
Px (Θ′) = [P x≥ (Θ′) ∧ P x≤ (Θ′) , P x≥ (Θ′) ∨ P x≤ (Θ′)] . (4)
Remark 7. The restriction to σ-fields with events common to valid and nonconservative confidence
measures strongly constrains the choice of the estimators to ensure the ability to assign a confidence
metalevel to any hypothesis of interest without a need for incomplete probability measures. The
further flexibility of allowing multiple σ-fields in a class of measure spaces may be desirable in some
applications.
Strategies developed within more conventional frequentist frameworks provide guidance on the
choice of which dual set estimators by which to induce the confidence metameasure. Extending the
statistical model to incorporate information from the physics of experimental design and measurement
can rule out many pathological set estimators as meaningless (McCullagh, 2002). For instance, the
inclusion of transformation-group structure in the model leads to set estimators that exactly match
Bayesian posterior credible sets under certain improper priors (Fraser, 1968; Helland, 2004). Without
taking advantage of extended models, Barndorff-Nielsen and Cox (1994, 121-122, 132-133), Sprott
(2000, pp. 75-76), and Brazzale et al. (2007) highlight advantages of incorporating information from
the likelihood function into set estimators; cf. Section 2.5.
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Example 8 (normal distribution). For n independent random variables each distributed according to
Pθ,γ , the normal distribution with mean θ and variance γ, the interval estimator Θα given by
Θα (x; ρ) =
[
p−1x (α) , p
−1
x (ρ+ α)
]
for all ρ ∈ [0, 1− α] is nested and is an exact ρ (100%) confidence interval for θ, where α ∈ [0, 1] , px (θ′)
is the upper-tailed p-value of the hypothesis that θ = θ′, and p−1x is the inverse of px. Since Θ
α is both
valid and nonconservative, it is dual to itself, yielding the equality of the valid and nonconservative
confidence measures P xα,≥ and P
x
α,≤, each the distribution of
ϑ = x¯+ Tn−1σˆ/
√
n,
where Tn−1 is the random variable of the Student t distribution with n− 1 degrees of freedom. Hence,
the confidence metameasure Pxα induced by Θα is degenerate:(
Θ,Ax,{P xα,≥, P xα,≤}) = (Θ,Ax, {P xα})
If Θ′ is an interval, then
P xα (Θ
′) = px (sup Θ′)− px (inf Θ′)
for all x ∈ Ω and Θ′ ∈ Ax, from which it follows that the confidence measure P xα does not depend on
the nested set estimator chosen and can thus be represented by P x.
Special properties of degenerate confidence metameasures are given in Section 3. The next example
involves a nondegenerate confidence metameasure.
Example 9 (binomial distribution). Let Pθ denote the binomial measure with n trials, success
probability θ ∈ Θ, and C-corrected, upper-tail cumulative probabilities pC,x (θ) = Pθ (X > x) +
CPθ (X = x) , with C ∈ [0, 1] . Consider the family FC = {ΘαC : α ∈ [0, 1]} of nested set estimators
such that
ΘαC (x; ρ) =

[
p−11−C,x (α) , p
−1
C,x (α+ ρ)
]
ρ ∈ (0, 1− α]
∅ ρ = 0
[0, 1] ρ = 1
for all α ∈ [0, 1] , ρ ∈ R = [0, 1− α] ∪ {1} , x ∈ {0, 1, ...} = Ω, where
p−1C′,x (α
′) = θ′ ⇐⇒ pC′,x (θ′) = α′. (5)
Since the rates at which the valid (C = 0) and nonconservative (C = 1) interval estimators cover θ are
bound according to
Pθ (θ ∈ Θα0 (X; ρ)) ≥ ρ,
Pθ (θ ∈ Θα1 (X; ρ)) ≤ ρ,
the sets F0 and F1 are valid and nonconservative families of nested set estimators, respectively, and for
any α ∈ [0, 1] , the valid set estimator Θα0 is dual to the nonconservative set estimator Θα1 , thus inducing
the valid confidence measure P xα,0, the nonconservative confidence measure P
x
α,1, and the confidence
metameasure Pxα on the σ-field B ([0, 1]) for each x ∈ Ω. In order to weigh evidence in X = x for the
hypothesis that 0 ≤ θ′ ≤ θ ≤ θ′′ ≤ 1, equation (2) furnishes
P xα,C
([
p−11−C,x (α) , p
−1
C,x (α+ ρC,x)
])
= ρC,x,
and, with equation (3),
P xα,C ([θ
′, θ′′]) = P xα,C
([
p−11−C,x (α) , p
−1
C,x
(
α+ ρ′′C,x
)])− P xα,C ([p−11−C,x (α) , p−1C,x (α+ ρ′C,x)])(6)
= ρ′′C,x − ρ′C,x,
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Figure 1: Confidence levels of the hypothesis that θ, the limiting relative frequency of successes, is
between 1/4 and 3/4 as a function of n, the number of independent trials, with θ = 2/3 as the unknown
true value. In the notation of Example 9, the nonconservative confidence level is P x1 ([1/4, 3/4]) , the
valid confidence level is P x0 ([1/4, 3/4]) , and the half-corrected level is P
x
1/2 ([1/4, 3/4]) . The confidence
level averaged over the convex set is defined in Section 3.1. Sampling variation was suppressed by
setting each number x of successes to the lowest integer greater than or equal to nθ instead of randomly
drawing values of x from the 〈n, θ〉 binomial distribution.
where
ρ′C,x = pC,x (θ
′)− α
ρ′′C,x = pC,x (θ
′′)− α.
Since α drops out of the difference, let P xC = P
x
α,C . For any Θ
′ ∈ B ([0, 1]) , equations (6) and (4)
specify the confidence metalevel of the hypothesis that θ ∈ Θ′. To illustrate the reduction of confidence
indeterminacy with additional observations, the boundary values of Px ([1/4, 3/4]) are plotted against
n in Fig. 1 for the θ = 2/3 case.
2.3 Coherence of confidence metalevels
The confidence metameasure Px on confidence spaceMx≥,≤ models the reasoning process of an ideal
agent betting on inclusion of the true parameter value in elements of Ax, the σ-field of Mx≥,≤, with
upper and lower betting odds determined by the coverage rates of the corresponding valid and non-
conservative confidence sets. The coherence of the agent's decisions may be evaluated by expressing
its betting odds in terms of upper and lower probabilities that lack the additivity property of Kol-
mogorov's probability measures. Given the dual functions u : Ax → [0, 1] and v : Ax → [0, 1] such
that
u (Θ′) + v (Θ\Θ′) = 1, (7)
u (Θ′ ∪Θ′′) ≥ u (Θ′) + u (Θ′′) ,
v (Θ′ ∪Θ′′) ≤ v (Θ′) + v (Θ′′)
for all disjoint Θ′ and Θ′′ in Ax, the values u (Θ′) and v (Θ′) are the lower and upper probabilities
(Molchanov, 2005, 9.3) of the hypothesis that θ ∈ Θ′. The decision-theoretic interpretation is that
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u (Θ′) is the largest price an agent would pay for a gain of 1θ (Θ′) , whereas v (Θ′) is the smallest price
for which the same agent would sell that gain, assuming an additive utility function (Walley, 1991).
The duality between u and v expressed as equation (7) means each function is completely determined
by the other.
The function u is called the lower envelope of a family P of measures on A if
u (Θ′) = inf
P∈P
P (Θ′)
for all Θ′ ∈ A (Coletti and Scozzafava, 2002, 15.2; Molchanov (2005, 9.3)). Since the lower envelope
of a family of probability measures is a coherent lower probability (Walley, 1991, 3.3.3; Molchanov
(2005, 9.3)) and since
{
P x≥, P
x
≤
}
as specified in Definition 6 constitutes such a family, the agent
weighing evidence for any hypothesis θ ∈ Θ′ by Px (Θ′) , with Θ′ ∈ Ax, satisfies the minimal set of
rationality axioms of Walley (1991). It follows that the agent avoids sure loss by making decisions
according to the lower and upper probabilities
u (Θ′) = P x≥ (Θ
′) ∧ P x≤ (Θ′) ,
v (Θ′) = 1− u (Θ\Θ′) .
Conversely, the framework of Section 2.2 can be presented starting with de Finetti's prevision and
the related concept of coherent extension (Walley, 1991; Coletti and Scozzafava, 2002) as follows. An
intelligent agent first sets its prices for buying and selling gambles on the hypotheses corresponding
to the elements of C according to the confidence coefficients of valid and nonconservative nested set
estimators. Then it extends its prices or previsions to the family of the two probability measures on
the σ-field induced by C in order to evaluate the probability of a hypothesis θ ∈ Θ′ for some Θ′ in the
σ-field but not in C. This family in turn yields coherent lower and upper probabilities that equal the
initial buying and selling prices whenever the latter apply, i.e., when the hypothesis is that θ ∈ Θ′ for
some Θ′ ∈ C. Thus, a Dutch book cannot be made against the agent.
2.4 Decisions under arbitrary loss
This section generalizes betting under 0-1 loss to making confidence-based decisions under any un-
bounded loss function. Confidence metalevels do not describe the actual betting behavior of any
human agent, but instead prescribe decisions, including amounts bet on any hypothesis involving θ,
given that the agent will incur a loss of La (θ) for taking action a.
According to a natural generalization of the Bayes decision rule of minimizing loss averaged over a
posterior distribution, action a′ dominates (is rationally preferred to) action a′′ if and only if
∀E ′ ∈ E (La′) , E ′′ ∈ E (La′′) : E ′ ≤ E ′′
∃E ′ ∈ E (La′) , E ′′ ∈ E (La′′) : E ′ < E ′′,
where both expectation intervals (Definition 2) are with respect to the same confidence metameasure
Px. The confidence metameasures impose no restrictions on agent decisions other than restricting them
to non-dominated actions.
This use of the confidence metameasure in making decisions follows a previous generalization of
maximizing expected utility to multi-valued probability. (Here, the utilities are expressed in terms
of equivalent losses, as is conventional in the statistics literature.) Kyburg (1990, pp. 180, 231-234;
2003; 2006) and Kaplan (1996, 1.4) used the principle of dominance to make decisions on the basis
of intervals of expected utilities determined by the expected utility of each probability measure: an
action yielding expected utilities in interval A is preferred to that yielding expected utilities in interval
B if at least one member of A is greater than all members of B and if no member of A is less than
any member of B.
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While multi-valued probabilities do not dictate how to choose one of the non-dominated actions in
situations that demand a choice equivalent to deciding between accepting a hypothesis or accepting its
alternative, they may prove more practical when indecision can be broken by additional considerations,
as Walley (1991, pp. 161-162, 235-241) explained. In the case of a human agent, Kyburg (2003) argued
for selecting among non-dominated actions on the basis of considerations that cannot be represented
mathematically rather than selecting on the basis of an arbitrary prior distribution.
If a single-valued estimate of 1Θ′ (θ) is needed for some Θ′ ∈ A, the indeterminacy supPx (Θ′) −
inf Px (Θ′) can quantify a set estimator's degree of undesirable conservatism; some ways to eliminate
such indeterminacy by replacing a confidence metameasure with a confidence measure are mentioned
in Section 3. If indeterminacy is removed, the above dominance principle reduces to the principle of
minimizing expected loss (3.2).
2.5 Likelihood principle
While in some cases the likelihood function can guide the construction of set estimators with desirable
properties, as noted in Section 2.2, it plays no general role in confidence decision theory. Consequently,
inference does not always obey the likelihood principle: some set estimators lead to values of evidential
support and partial proof that depend on information in the sampling model not encoded in the
likelihood function; cf. Wilkinson (1977).
An advantage of coherent statistical methods in general is the flexibility they give the researcher
to simultaneously consider as many hypotheses and interval estimates for θ as desired. Although such
versatility is usually presented as a consequence of the likelihood principle and Bayesian statistics,
they are not needed to secure it once coherence has been established (2.3).
That the proposed framework is not constrained by the likelihood principle distinguishes it from
Peter Walley'sW1 andW2, two inferential theories of indeterminate (multi-valued) probability intended
to satisfy the best aspects of both coherence and frequentism (Walley, 2002). The coverage error rate
of W1 tends to be much higher than the nominal rate in order to ensure simultaneous compliance
with the likelihood principle. Although the principle often precludes approximately correct frequentist
coverage, more power can be achieved by less stringently controlling the error rate (Walley, 2002).
Walley (2002) did not report the degree of conservatism of W2, a normalized likelihood method. With
a uniform measure for integration over parameter space, the normalized likelihood is equal to the
Bayesian posterior that results from a uniform prior.
3 Frequentist posterior distribution
An important realm for practical applications of the above framework is the situation in which inference
may reasonably depend only on a single confidence measure P x rather than directly on a confidence
metameasure Px. That is possible not only in the special case of degeneracy due to the availability of a
suitable exact nested set estimator (Example 8), but can also be achieved either by transforming a non-
degenerate confidence metameasure to a confidence measure (3.1) or by approximating a confidence
measure. Remark 16 concerns the latter strategy in the case of a scalar parameter of interest.
Relying solely on a single confidence measure for inference and decision making (3.2) enjoys the
coherence of theories of utility maximization usually associated with Bayesianism (3.3). In the ubiqui-
tous special case of a scalar parameter of interest, a single confidence level of a hypothesis is a consistent
estimator of whether the hypothesis is true under more general conditions than is the p-value as such
an estimator (3.4).
3.1 Reducing a confidence metameasure
Interpreting upper and lower probabilities as bounds defining a family of permissible probability
measures, Williamson (2007) argued for minimizing expected loss with respect to a single distri-
bution within the family instead of using outside considerations to choose among actions that are
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non-dominated in the sense of Section 2.4. Consider the confidence metameasure space Mx≥,≤ =(
Θ,Ax,{P x≥, P x≤}) of confidence metameasure Px for some x ∈ Ω. A much larger family P of mea-
sures on Ax such that {P x≥, P x≤} and P have the same lower envelope u is the convex set
P = {P xD : D ∈ [0, 1]} ,
where P xD = (1−D)P x≥ + DP x≤, thereby forming the metaprobability space M˜x≥,≤ = (Θ,Ax,P) and
probability metameasure P˜x; cf. Smith (1961, 11); Wasserman (1990); Paris (1994, pp. 40-42). Since
P˜x = Px, the measure P x ∈ P selected according to some rule is called a reduction of Px.
Effective reduction of Px to a single measure P x can be accomplished by averaging over P with
respect to the Lebesgue measure. That average of the convex set is simply the mean of the valid and
nonconservative confidence measures:
P x (Θ′) =
∫ 1
0
P xD (Θ
′) dD =
(
P x≥ (Θ
′) + P x≤ (Θ
′)
)
/2 = P x1/2 (Θ
′) (8)
for all Θ′ ∈ Ax; recall that P x1/2 ∈ P.
Other automatic methods of reducing a metameasure to a single measure are also available. For
example, the recommendation of Williamson (2007) to select the measure within the family that
maximizes the entropy is minimax under Kullback-Leibler loss (Grünwald, 2004).
Example 10 (Binomial distribution, continued from Example 9). As the gray line in Fig. 1 indicates,
the mean measure P x of the convex set (8) yields a confidence level between those of the valid and
nonconservative confidence measures, discarding the notable reduction in confidence nondegeneracy
from n = 1 to n = 10 as irrelevant for action in situations that do not permit indecision. The
approximate (half-corrected) confidence level also disregards nondegeneracy information, yielding in
this special case the same levels of confidence as does P x. In contrast, the confidence metameasure
records the nondegeneracy as the difference between the agent's selling and buying prices of a gamble
with a payoff contingent on whether or not θ ∈ [1/4, 3/4] , a difference that becomes less important as
n increases.
3.2 Confidence-based decision and inference
3.2.1 Minimizing expected loss
In a situation requiring a decision involving the acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis that θ ∈ Θ′,
that is, under a 0-1 loss function, an agent guided by a single measure P x regards P x (ϑ ∈ Θ′) /P x (ϑ /∈ Θ′)
as the fair betting odds and will act accordingly. The hypothesis θ ∈ Θ′ will be accepted only if the
odds P x (ϑ ∈ Θ′) /P x (ϑ /∈ Θ′) are greater than the ratio of the cost that would be incurred if θ /∈ Θ′
to the benefit that would be gained if θ ∈ Θ′. Otherwise, unless the odds are exactly equal to 1, the
hypothesis θ /∈ Θ′ will be accepted. Under a more general class of loss functions, the decision theory
of Section 2.4 reduces to the minimization of expected loss given the degeneracy or reduction of the
confidence metameasure. Section 3.3.2 notes implications for axiomatic coherence.
3.2.2 Applications to hypothesis assessment
As the findings of basic science are arguably valuable even if never applied and since the ways in
which any inductive inference will be used are often unpredictable (Fisher, 1973, pp. 95-96, 103-106),
P x (ϑ ∈ Θ′) may be reported as an estimate of 1Θ′ (θ) for use with currently unknown loss functions
(cf. Jeffrey, 1986; Hwang 1992). That inferential role is currently played in many of the sciences by
the p-value interpreted as a measure of evidence in significance testing (Cox, 1977), but its notorious
lack of coherence has prevented its universal acceptance (e.g., Royall, 1997). As will become clear in
Section 3.4, P x (ϑ ∈ Θ′) can differ markedly from the p-value for testing θ ∈ Θ′ as the null hypothesis
not only in interpretation but also in numeric value.
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Example 11. Efron and Tibshirani (1998, 3) consider the hypothesis that the mean ξ of a ν-
dimensional multivariate normal distribution of an identity covariance matrix is in an origin-centered
sphere of radius θ′′ but outside a concentric sphere of radius θ′. Let θ = ||ξ||, and let χ2ν be the
chi-squared cumulative distribution function (CDF) of ν degrees of freedom. Since the p-value of the
null hypothesis that θ ≥ θ′ is χ2ν
(
(||x||/θ′)2
)
, the confidence level of the hypothesis that θ′ < θ < θ′′
is
P x (θ′ < ϑ < θ′′) = χ2ν
(
(||x||/θ′)2
)
− χ2ν
(
(||x||/θ′′)2
)
,
the value of which Efron and Tibshirani (1998, 4) justified as an approximation to a Bayesian posterior
probability. The coherence of the confidence measure P x immunizes it against the inconsistencies that
Efron and Tibshirani (1998, 3) noticed among p-values: contradictory conclusions would be reached
depending on which hypothesis was considered as the null.
A practical implication of working in the confidence metameasure framework is that since the simple
bootstrap methods of Efron and Tibshirani (1998) based on a scalar pivot enable close approximations
to p-value functions (Efron, 1993; Schweder and Hjort, 2002; Singh et al., 2005; Xiong and Mu, 2009),
they can solve related problems too complex for more rigid Neyman-Pearson methods and yet without
any need to seek matching priors for justification; cf. Efron (2003). Applications include assigning
levels of confidence to phylogenetic tree branches Efron et al. (1996), to observed local maxima in an
estimated function (Efron and Tibshirani, 1998; Hall, 2004), and to gene network connections found on
the basis of microarray data (Kamimura et al., 2003). Liu (1997) studied operating characteristics of
the empirical strength probability (ESP), which in the one-dimensional case is equal to some confidence
probability P x (θ′ < ϑ < θ′′) defined with respect to a bootstrap algorithm.
See Polansky (2007) for an accessible introduction to the general problem of observed confidence
levels of composite hypotheses, which Efron and Tibshirani (1998) had dubbed the problem of re-
gions, understood to include applications to ranking and selection as well as those mentioned above.
The fundamental characteristic of this approach is not the bootstrapping technique as much as the
property that the level of confidence in any given region is equal to the coverage rate of a corresponding
confidence set. Until the ESP is seen to have a compelling justification of its own, it may continue
to be regarded merely as a method of last resort since it is in general neither a Bayesian posterior
probability nor a Neyman-Pearson p-value: For [the latter] reason, it seems best to use the ESP only
when more specific, direct testing methods are not available for a particular problem (Davison et al.,
2003). That the ESP and other approximations of the confidence value are more acceptable than
p-values as estimates of whether the parameter lies in a given region (3.4.4) gives cause to reconsider
that judgment even apart from the coherence of the confidence value.
Example 12 (beyond statistical significance). Consider the null hypothesis θ′ − ∆ ≤ θ ≤ θ′ + ∆,
where the non-negative scalar ∆ is a minimal degree of practical or scientific significance in a particular
application. For instance, researchers developing methods of analyzing microarray data are increasingly
calling for specification of a minimal level of biological significance when testing null hypotheses of
equivalent gene expression against alternative hypotheses of differential gene expression (Lewin et al.,
2006; Van De Wiel and Kim, 2007; Bochkina and Richardson, 2007; Bickel, 2008). Bickel (2004)
and McCarthy and Smyth (2009) in effect approached the problem with p-values of composite null
hypotheses, in conflict with the confidence measure approach (Example 18 and Section 3.4.4).
Section 3.4.3 provides additional examples that contrast hypothesis confidence levels with hypoth-
esis p-values in practical applications.
3.2.3 Other applications of minimizing expected loss
The framework of minimizing expected loss with respect to a confidence measure (3.2.1) not only
leads to assigning confidence levels to hypotheses but also provides methods for optimal estimation
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and prediction. In addition, confidence-measure estimators and predictors have frequentist properties
only shared with Bayesian estimators and predictors when the Bayesian posterior is a confidence
measure.
As the frequentist posterior, the confidence measure gives all the point estimators provided by
the Bayesian posterior. For example, the frequentist posterior mean, minimizing expected squared
error loss, is ϑ¯x =
∫
Θ
ϑdP x (ϑ) and the frequentist posterior p-quantile, minimizing expected loss for a
threshold-based function of p (Carlin and Louis, 2009, App. B), is ϑ (p) such that p = P x (ϑ < ϑ (p)) .
Assuming a differentiable CDF of P x, Singh et al. (2007) proved the weak consistency of the frequentist
posterior median ϑ (1/2) and the frequentist posterior mean ϑ¯x and proved that the former is median-
unbiased. In that case, the frequentist mode, the value maximizing the probability density function of
ϑ, is also available if a unique maximum exists.
The frequentist posterior predictive distribution, the frequentist analog of the Bayesian posterior
predictive distribution of a new observation of X, is P (x) =
∫
Θ
Pϑ,γdP
x (ϑ) for all x ∈ Ω. (Dawid and
Wang (1993), van Berkum (1996), and Hannig (2009) considered this with fiducial-like distributions in
place of the confidence measure P x.) Appropriate point predictions are ξ¯x =
∫
Ω
X (ω) dP (x) (ω) in the
regression case of continuous Ω and ξ˜x = 1[1/2,1]
(
P (x) (X = 1)
)
in the classification case in which
Ω = {0, 1}. If P x is approximated using a bootstrap algorithm as in Section 3.2.2, then the resulting
values of ξ¯x and ξ˜x are bootstrap aggregation (bagging) predictions; Breiman (1996) found bagging
to reduce prediction error. The confidence predictive distribution can also be used to determine sizes
of new studies by accounting for uncertainty in the effect size. (The classical method of determining
the sample size of a planned experiment is often criticized for relying on a point estimate of the effect
size.)
3.3 Confidence versus Bayesian probability
As the examples of Section 3.2 illustrate, many uses of Bayesian posterior distributions are completely
compatible with confidence measures since both distributions of parameters deliver coherent inferences
in the form of probabilities that hypotheses of interest are true. However, to the extent that updating
parameter distributions in agreement with valid confidence intervals conflicts with updating them
by Bayes's formula, confidence decision theory differs fundamentally from the two dominant forms
of Bayesianism, subjective Bayesianism, which is seldom used by the statistics community, and
objective Bayesianism broadly defined as a collection of algorithms for generating prior distributions
from sampling distributions or from invariance arguments. Nonetheless, the proposed framework
follows from an application of de Finetti's theory of prevision to an agent that makes decisions according
to certain confidence levels (2.3).
3.3.1 Bayesian conditioning
As demonstrated in Section 2.3, the proposed framework for frequentist inference satisfies coherence,
which does not require the probability distribution of the parameters to correspond to any Bayesian
posterior distribution, a prior distribution conditional on the observed data in the Kolmogorov sense,
as is frequently supposed. Not coherence but another pillar of Bayesianism mandates that the posterior
distribution, i.e., the parameter distribution used for decisions after making an observation, must equal
the prior distribution conditioned on the observation (Goldstein, 1985). That assumption, usually
implicit, has been stated as a plausible principle of learning from data:
Definition 13 (Bayesian temporal principle). Consider the prior distribution pi, a probability measure
induced by a random vector ϑ in Θ, the parameter space. Let the update rule pi′• denote a function
mapping Ω, the sample space, to a set of probability measures, each defined on Θ. If, for all x′ ∈ Ω,
the posterior distribution pi′x′ induced by random quantity ϑ
′
x′ in Θ is the conditional distribution of
ϑ given X ′ = x′, then pi′• satisfies the Bayesian temporal principle, pi
′
x′ is called a Bayesian posterior
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distribution, and the equivalence between the posterior and conditional distributions is written as
ϑ′x′ ≡ ϑ|x′.
Remark 14. In the one-dimensional case, the Bayesian temporal principle stipulates that, for all Θ′ ⊆
Θ,
pi′x (ϑ
′ ∈ Θ′) = pi (ϑ ∈ Θ′|X ′ = x′) ,
where pi′x and pi are the posterior and prior distributions of ϑ
′ and ϑ, respectively. Adding a prime
symbol (′) for each successive observation gives ϑ′x′ ≡ ϑ|x′, ϑ′′x′′ ≡ ϑ′x′ |x′′, ϑ′′′x′′′ ≡ ϑ′′x′′ |x′′′, and so
forth. Goldstein (2001) coined the name of the principle, explaining that it unreasonably requires
that an agent's conditional betting odds (prior odds conditional on a contemplated future observation)
determines its future betting odds (posterior odds as a function of the actual observation). In other
words, the current rate of machine learning is limited by the previous strength of machine belief.
Goldstein (2001) pointed out that although Bayesians follow the temporal principle when using
Bayes's formula, they disregard it every time they revise a prior or sampling model upon seeing new
data. Such revision occurs whenever posterior predictions are subjected to frequentist model checking
procedures such as cross validation. One rationale for revising the prior is that poor frequentist
performance may indicate that it did not adequately reflect the available information as well as it
might have had it been more carefully elicited. Another is the receipt of new information that cannot
be represented in the probability space of the initial prior (Diaconis and Zabell, 1982).
3.3.2 Non-Bayesian coherence
Confidence decision theory not only satisfies coherence in the sense of avoiding sure loss (2.3), but,
when reduced to the minimization of expected loss with respect to a single confidence measure (3.2),
is also coherent in the sense of axiomatic systems of expected utility maximization (von Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1944; Savage, 1954). While both approaches to coherence support the concept of
placing bets in accord with the laws of probability, including conditional probability for called-off bets,
none of the approaches entails the equality of conditional probability as defined by Kolmogorov and
posterior probability as the hypothesis probability updated as a function of observed data. Replacing
probabilities with proposition truth values and conditional probabilities with theorems (statements
of implication) furnishes an illustration from deductive logic (Jeffrey, 1986): an agent whose set of
propositions held to be true do not contradict each other at any point in time is completely self-
consistent. However, the agent cannot comply with the deductive version of the Bayesian temporal
principle unless none of the truth values ever requires revision (Howson, 1997). As a finitely additive
probability distribution, the confidence measure also agrees with axiomatic systems of probabilistic
logic such as that of Cox (1961).
The above accounts of coherence provide no support for the Bayesian temporal principle since their
theorems involve conditional probability, not posterior probability as specified by some update rule pi′•.
Simply defining the posterior distribution to be Kolmogorov's conditional distribution given the data
either specifies nothing about how parameter distributions are updated with new data or conceals the
assumption of the Bayesian temporal principle (Hacking, 1967).
Even though the statistical literature refers to many theorems supporting coherence and rationality
as understood in Section 2.3, discussion of the foundational principle of Bayesianism has instead taken
place mostly in the philosophical literature. David Lewis (Teller, 1973) presented a transformation
of the Dutch book game (2.3) into one in which the gambler knows the rule the casino agent uses
to update its betting odds on receipt of new information. In that game, but not in the original
Dutch book game, violation of the Bayesian temporal principle leads the casino to sure loss (Teller,
1973; Vineberg, 1997). Since such violation occurs over time, it is considered a breach of diachronic
game-theoretic coherence, a restriction on the degree to which an agent's betting odds can change over
time, as opposed to synchronic game-theoretic coherence, a consistency in an agent's betting odds at
any given time (Armendt, 1992). Accordingly, the Dutch book arguments for diachronic coherence
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have been considered much weaker (Maher, 1992; Goldstein, 2006; Williamson, 2009) than those for
synchronic coherence, the type of coherence supported by the theorems of de Finetti (1970) and Savage
(1954). Goldstein (1997), Hacking (2001, pp. 256-260), and Williamson (2009), while accepting Dutch
book arguments for synchronic coherence, do not consider diachronic coherence to be a requirement of
logical thought. Hild (1998) distinguished game-theoretic diachronic coherence from decision-theoretic
diachronic coherence, arguing that the latter rules out the Bayesian temporal principle as incoherent.
Another difficulty is that some Dutch book arguments lead to versions of diachronic coherence that
conflict with the Bayesian temporal principle (Armendt, 1992).
In summary, the theorems routinely presented as proof that all rational thought or coherent de-
cision making must be Bayesian actually prove no more than the irrationality of violating the logic
of standard probability theory. Thus, any decision-theoretic framework representing unknown values
as random quantities mapped from some probability space stands on equal ground with Bayesianism
as far as the minimal requirements of rationality are concerned. Such frameworks include geometric
conditioning (Goldstein, 2001), probability kinematics (Diaconis and Zabell, 1982; Jeffrey, 2004), dy-
namic coherence (Skyrms, 1997; Zabell, 2002), and relative entropy maximization (Grünwald, 2004;
Jaeger, 2005; Williamson, 2009) as well as confidence decision theory (3.4).
3.3.3 Objections to frequentist posteriors
Since, neglecting sufficiency and ancillarity considerations, the confidence level is numerically equal to
the fiducial probability in the case of a one-dimensional parameter of interest given continuous data
(Wilkinson, 1977), some classical Bayesian objections against the coherence of fiducial distributions
apply with equal force against the coherence of the confidence measure. The strength of such arguments
is now evaluated in light of the above distinction between axiomatic coherence and the Bayes update
rule.
In the present framework, confidence-based or fiducial probabilities of hypotheses correspond to rea-
sonable betting odds, a consequence that Cornfield (1969) considered impossible since Lindley (1958)
had demonstrated that fiducial distributions are Bayesian posteriors only in certain special cases and
since placing conditional bets contrary to conditional probability leads to certain loss. The conclusion
drawn by Cornfield (1969) would only follow under the widely held but incorrect assumption that
a parameter distribution must be a Bayesian posterior for it to satisfy coherence. Lindley (1958),
extending the work of Grundy (1956), actually had found conditions under which the fiducial distribu-
tion violates the Bayesian temporal principle considered in Section 3.3, not that a conditional fiducial
distribution is incompatible with the definition of a conditional probability distribution.
Lindley (1958) also demonstrated that violation of the Bayesian temporal principle means the
pivot is not unique, leading to non-unique fiducial distributions. In light of the subsequent failure of a
generation of statisticians to identify any genuinely noninformative priors (Dawid et al., 1973; Walley,
1991, pp. 226-235; Kass and Wasserman, 1996; Helland, 2004), the belated rejoinder is that Bayesian
posteriors lack uniqueness as well (Fraser, 2008a; Hannig, 2009). Just as given a prior, sampling model,
and data, all inferences made using the resulting Bayesian posterior measure are coherent, so given
an exact estimator, sampling model, and data, all inferences made using the resulting confidence or
fiducial measure are equally coherent. Thus, the selection of frequentist set estimators parallels the
selection of priors, and in each case such selection may depend on the intended application. Section
2.2 points to reasonable criteria for such selection.
3.4 Scalar subparameter case
The equality between tail probabilities of a confidence measures and p-values will be used to prove a
consistency property that holds under more general conditions for a confidence level than for a p-value
as estimators of composite hypothesis truth.
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3.4.1 Confidence CDF as the p-value function
If decisions are based on a single confidence measure of a scalar parameter of interest, then the CDF
of that measure is an upper-tailed p-value function.
Definition 15. Consider a function p+ : Ω×Θ→ [0, 1] such that p+ (x, •) = p+x (•) is a CDF for all
x ∈ Ω and such that
Pξ
(
p+X (θ) < α
)
= α (9)
for all θ ∈ Θ, ξ ∈ Ξ, and α ∈ [0, 1] . Then, for any x ∈ Ω, the map p+x : Θ→ [0, 1] is called an upper-tail
p-value function for θ. Likewise, p−x : Θ→ [0, 1] is called a lower-tail p-value function if
p−x (θ) = 1− p+x (θ) (10)
for all θ ∈ Θ and for all x ∈ Ω.
Uniformly distributed under the simple null hypothesis that θ = θ′, p−x (θ
′) and p+x (θ
′) are exact
p-values of one-sided tests. Since equation (10) is an isomorphism between the two p-value functions,
the pair 〈p−x (θ′) , p+x (θ′)〉 will be called the p-value function, either element of which may be designated
by p±X (θ
′) . The two-sided p-value of the null hypothesis that θ is in a central region Θ′ of Θ is
px (Θ′) = 2 sup
θ′∈Θ′
p−x (θ
′) ∧ p+x (θ′)
for all x ∈ Ω, reducing to the usual px (Θ′) = 2p−x (θ′) ∧ p+x (θ′) for the point hypothesis that θ = θ′.
While the name p-value function used by Fraser (1991) has become standard in the scientific
literature, significance function is also used in higher-order asymptotics (e.g., Brazzale et al. (2007)).
Efron (1993), Schweder and Hjort (2002), and Singh et al. (2007) prefer the term confidence distribution,
avoided here to clearly distinguish the p-value function from the confidence measure as a Kolmogorov
probability distribution. (Whereas any p-value function is isomorphic to a unique confidence measure
as defined in Section 2.2, the p-value function can also be isomorphic to an incomplete probability
measure. Wilkinson (1977) constructed a theory of incoherence based on such a measure, underscoring
the need to sharply distinguish confidence measures from p-value functions.)
By the usual concept of statistical power, the Type II error rate of p± associated with testing the
false null hypothesis that θ = θ′ at significance level α is β± (α, θ, θ′) = Pξ
(
p±X (θ
′) > α
)
for any θ ≷ θ′.
For all α1, α2 ∈ [0, 1] such that α1 + α2 < 1,
Pξ
(
α1 < p
+
X (θ) < 1− α2
)
= 1− α1 − α2,
implying that θ+X : [0, 1] → Θ, the inverse function of p+X , yields
(
θ+X (α1) , θ
+
X (1− α2)
)
as an exact
100 (1− α1 − α2) % confidence interval (Fraser, 1991; Efron, 1993; Schweder and Hjort, 2002; Singh
et al., 2007).
Remark 16. In many applications, approximate p-value functions replace those that exactly satisfy
the definition. For instance, Schweder and Hjort (2002) use a half-corrected p-value function like
pC,x of Example 9 for discrete data. Other approximations involve parameter distributions with
asymptotically correct frequentist coverage, including the asymptotic p-value functions of Singh et al.
(2005), the distributions of asymptotic generalized pivotal quantities of Xiong and Mu (2009), some of
the generalized fiducial distributions of Hannig (2009), and the Bayesian posteriors of Section 1.1. As
with frequentist inference in general, asymptotics provide approximations that in many applications
prove sufficiently accurate for inference in the absence of exact results (Reid, 2003).
3.4.2 Interpretations of the p-value function
In its history, the p-value function has had Neymanian, Fisherian, and Bayesian interpretations. Con-
sistently viewing the p-value function within the Neyman-Pearson framework rather than as the CDF
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of a probability measure of θ, Fraser (1991), Schweder and Hjort (2002), Singh et al. (2005), and Singh
et al. (2007) have used p+ to concisely present information about hypothesis tests and confidence
intervals in data analysis results. The p-value function thus interpreted as a warehouse of results of
potential hypothesis tests and confidence intervals has also uncovered relationships with the Bayesian
and fiducial frameworks (Schweder and Hjort, 2002). Schweder and Hjort (2002) aimed to demon-
strate the power of the frequentist methodology by means of reporting on the p-value function and
likelihood function as key components of a unified Neyman-Pearson alternative to Bayesian posterior
distributions, which can fail to yield interval estimates guaranteed to cover true parameter value at
some given rate. Interestingly, the incipient p-value function had been originally conceived as a Fishe-
rian alternative to what was seen as a mechanical use of the Neyman-Pearson confidence interval (Cox,
1958).
In a move away from both of the main frequentist interpretations of the p-value function, Efron
(1993) proposed a simple, fast algorithm for computing an implied prior density and an implied like-
lihood from a confidence density assumed to be proportional to a Bayesian posterior density. He
reported that with a confidence density based on an exponential model and the ABC confidence in-
terval method, the disagreement between the implied likelihood and the true likelihood observed by
Lindley (1958) is small in most cases, with the implication that the confidence density approximates
a Bayesian posterior, thereby establishing approximate coherence. However, while compatibility with
a Bayesian posterior is sufficient for coherence, it is by no means necessary (2.3, 3.3).
Dropping the requirement of approximating a Bayesian posterior enables more exact frequentist
coverage in many instances without sacrificing the coherence achieved by Efron (1993). The concept of
coherence is itself sufficient to recast the p-value function from a pure Neyman-Pearson toolbox into a
versatile weapon for statistical inference and decision making, enabling all of the applications available
to a Bayesian posterior distribution of the interest parameter, marginal over any nuisance parameters
(cf. Efron, 1998).
In addition, information in the form of a subjective prior distribution can be incorporated into
frequentist data analysis by combining the prior with the p-value function (Bickel, 2006) under the
following circumstances. Suppose Agents A and B each bases the posterior probability measure by
which it makes decisions (3.2) on confidence sets according to the framework of Section 2.3 whenever
the observation that X = x constitutes the only information about the parameter of interest. Agent
A observes x, which would yield the confidence measure P x on (Θ,A) , but it also has independent
information in the form of Q, a probability measure on (Θ,A) elicited from Agent B, where Θ ⊆ R1.
Since Agent B would have set Q to equal a confidence measure if possible, Agent A processes Q
exactly as it would a confidence measure computed on the basis of data independent of X. Since each
of several methods of combining p-value functions from independent data sets yields an approximate
p-value function incorporating information from both data sets (Singh et al., 2005), Agent A bases its
decisions on P x ⊕Q, the probability measure of the CDF obtained by applying any such combination
method to the CDFs of P x and Q. It follows that if Q is in fact a confidence measure, then P x⊕Q is a
confidence measure to the same degree of approximation as the combined CDF is a p-value function.
Agents A and B may actually be the same agent, which would be the case if Agent A had computed
the prior Q as a confidence measure on the basis of independent data that are no longer available. In
conclusion, the presence of important information in the form of a prior probability distribution on
(Θ,A) does not in itself necessitate moving from confidence-based statistics to Bayesian statistics.
3.4.3 Confidence levels versus p-values
Although both confidence levels and p-values can be computed from the same p-value function, the
following examples illustrate how they can lead to different inferences and decisions. Section 3.4.4 then
demonstrates that the former but not the latter are consistent as estimators of composite hypothesis
truth.
Example 17 (point null hypothesis). If P x (ϑ < •) is continuous on Θ, then P x (θ = θ′) = 0 for any
interior point θ′ of Θ. This means that given any alternative hypothesis θ ∈ Θ′ such that P x (θ ∈ Θ′) >
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0, betting on θ = θ′ versus θ ∈ Θ′ at any finite betting odds will result in expected loss, reflecting
the absence of information singling out the point θ = θ′ as a viable possibility before the data were
observed. (By contrast, the usual two-sided p-value is numerically equal to px (θ′) , which does not
necessarily equal the probability of any hypothesis of interest.) If, on the other hand, the parameter
value can equal the null hypothesis value for all practical purposes, that fact may be represented by
modeling the parameter of interest as a random effect with nonzero probability at the null hypothesis
value. The latter option would define the confidence measure such that its CDF is a predictive p-value
function such as that used by Lawless and Fredette (2005).
Example 18 (bioequivalence). Regulatory agencies often need an estimate of 1[θ′−∆,θ′+∆] (θ) , the
indicator of whether the hypothesis that the continuous parameter of interest lies within ∆ of θ′ for
some ∆ > 0; a value common in bioequivalence studies is ∆ = log (125%) with exp (θ′) as the efficacy of
a medical treatment. For the purpose of deciding whether to approve a new treatment or a genetically
modified crop, estimates provided by companies with obvious conflicts of interest must be as objective
as possible. The Neyman-Pearson framework in effect enables conservative tests of the null hypotheses
θ ∈ [θ′ −∆, θ′ + ∆], θ < θ′ −∆, and θ > θ′ + ∆ (Wellek, 2003) but without guidance on how to use
the resulting p-values px (θ′) , p+x (θ
′ −∆) , and p−x (θ′ + ∆) to make coherent decisions, which would
instead require estimates of 1(−∞,θ′−∆) (θ) , 1[θ′−∆,θ′+∆] (θ) , and 1(θ′+∆,∞) (θ) such that the sum of
the estimates is 1. The probabilities P x (ϑ < θ′ −∆) , P x (θ′ −∆ ≤ ϑ ≤ θ′ + ∆) , and P x (ϑ > θ′ + ∆)
qualify as such estimates without suffering from the subjective or arbitrary nature of assigning a prior
distribution. Due to the coherence of probabilistic indicator estimators, regulators may simultaneously
consider more complex estimates such as P x (ϑ > θ′ + ∆|ϑ /∈ [θ′ −∆, θ′ + ∆]), the probability that
the effect size is high given that it is non-negligible, without the multiplicity concerns that plague
Neymanian statistics (2.5). Singh et al. (2007) also compared the use of observed confidence levels to
conventional methods of bioequivalence.
3.4.4 Consistency of hypothesis confidence
More terminology will be introduced to establish a sense in which the confidence value but not the
p-value consistently estimates the hypothesis indicator.
Definition 19. An indicator estimator 1ˆ is consistent if, for all Θ′ ∈ A,
1ˆΘ′ (X)
Pθ,γ−−−→ 1Θ′ (θ)
for every γ ∈ Γ and for every θ that is an element of Θ but not of the boundary of Θ′.
By the usual concept of statistical power, the Type II error rate of p± associated with testing the
false null hypothesis that θ = θ′ at significance level α is β± (α, θ, θ′) = Pθ,γ
(
p±X (θ
′) > α
)
for any
θ ≷ θ′. Commonly used in two-sided testing, the two-sided p-value of the null hypothesis that θ ∈ Θ′
is for all Θ′ ⊆ Θ and x ∈ Ω.
The next two propositions contrast the consistency of the confidence value with the inconsistency
of the two-sided p-value.
Proposition 20. Assume all one-sided tests represented by the p-value functions p± are asymptotically
powerful in the sense that limn→∞ β± (α, θ, θ′) = 0 for all α ∈ (0, 1) and for all θ, θ′ ∈ Θ such that
θ ≷ θ′. The function 1ˆ : A×Ω→ [0, 1] is a consistent indicator estimator if P x = 1ˆ• (x) is a confidence
measure corresponding to p± given X = x for all x ∈ Ω.
Proof. By the definition of the boundary of a set Θ′ as the difference between its closure Θ¯′ and its
interior int Θ′, the theorem asserts that, for all Θ′ ∈ A, θ is either in int Θ′, in which case the theorem
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asserts PX (Θ′)
Pθ,γ−−−→ 1, or θ is in Θ\Θ′, in which case the theorem asserts PX (Θ′) Pθ,γ−−−→ 0. Let A′
represent the set of all disjoint open Each term of the sum expands as
PX (Θ′′′) = PX ((inf Θ′′′, sup Θ′′′)) = p+X (sup Θ
′′′)− p+X (inf Θ′′′)
= p−X (inf Θ
′′′)− p−X (sup Θ′′′)
= 1− p−X (sup Θ′′′)− p+X (inf Θ′′′) .
As the p-value functions are asymptotically powerful, p±X (θ
′)
Pθ,γ−−−→ 0 for all α ∈ (0, 1) and for all
θ, θ′ ∈ Θ such that θ ≷ θ′, with the result that each term may be written as a function of p-values
that converge in Pθ,γ to 0:
PX (Θ′′′) =

p−X (inf Θ
′′′)− p−X (sup Θ′′′) θ < inf Θ′′′
1− p−X (sup Θ′′′)− p+X (inf Θ′′′) θ ∈ Θ′′′
p+X (sup Θ
′′′)− p+X (inf Θ′′′) θ > sup Θ′′′
Pθ,γ−−−→

0− 0 θ < inf Θ′′′
1− 0− 0 θ ∈ Θ′′′
0− 0 θ > sup Θ′′′
for all Θ′′′ ∈ A′. Summing the terms over A′ yields
PX (Θ′)
Pθ,γ−−−→
∑
Θ′′′∈A′
1Θ′′′ (θ) = 1Θ′ (θ)
since θ ∈ int Θ′ implies that θ is in one element of A′.
Remark 21. Polansky (2007, pp. 37-38) proved a similar proposition of consistency given a smooth
distribution Pθ,γ . A suitably transformed likelihood ratio test statistic is also a consistent indicator
estimator under the standard regularity conditions (Bickel, 2008).
Proposition 22. Under the conditions of Theorem 20, the two-sided p-value pX (Θ′) is not a consis-
tent indicator estimator.
Proof. For any θ ∈ Θ′ ∈ A, the distribution of the two-sided p-value pX (Θ′) converges to the uniform
distribution on [0, 1] (Singh et al., 2007), violating consistency (Definition 19).
4 Discussion
The confidence metameasure Px and the confidence measure or frequentist posterior P x bring both
coherence and consistency to frequentist inference and decision making.
The coherence property established in Section 2.3 confers the ability to consistently and directly
report the levels of confidence of as many complex hypotheses as desired and to perform estimation
and prediction (3.2). Even though the frequentist posterior P x is a flexible distribution of possible
values of a fixed parameter, it requires no prior; in fact, P x need not even necessarily correspond to any
Bayesian posterior distribution (3.3). In conclusion, the metalevel or level of confidence in a given
hypothesis has the internal coherence of the Bayesian posterior or class of such posteriors without
requiring a prior distribution or even an exact confidence set estimator.
More can be said if the parameter of interest is one-dimensional, in which case the confidence level
of a composite hypothesis is consistent as an estimate of whether that hypothesis is true, whereas
neither the Bayesian posterior probability nor the p-value is generally consistent in that sense (3.4.4).
Specifically, the equality of the confidence level of θ ∈ Θ′ to the coverage rate of the corresponding
confidence set guarantees convergence in probability to 1 if θ is in the interior of Θ′ or to 0 if θ /∈ Θ′
(Proposition 20).
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